Journal of Accountancy
Volume 44

Issue 3

Article 5

9-1927

Income-tax Department
Stephen G. Rusk

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Rusk, Stephen G. (1927) "Income-tax Department," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 44 : Iss. 3 , Article 5.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol44/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Included in the recent rulings summarized in the July issue of The Journal
States district court of the south
ern division of Georgia, in the case of the United States v. William H. Haar, et
al. in which the court ruled that “ a return is an essential preliminary to the as
sessment of income tax under section 3176 of the revised statutes as amended by
the acts of 1916 and 1918, and a telegram from an internal revenue agent
in charge recommending immediate assessment of income tax is not such return
as is required nor a substitute therefor.”
Section 3176 of the revised statutes as amended by acts of 1916 and 1918,
reads, in part, as follows:
of Accountancy was a decision by the United

“If any person, corporation, company or association fails to make and
file a return or list at the time prescribed by law, or makes, willfully or
otherwise, a false or fraudulent return or list, the collector or deputy col
lector shall make the return or list from his own knowledge and from such
information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise. The com
missioner of internal revenue shall assess all taxes, other than stamp
taxes, as to which returns or lists are so made by a collector or deputy
collector.”
As the court pointed out, a return of income tax shall set out specifically the
amount of the gross income from all separate sources and from the total thereof
there shall be deducted the aggregate items of allowances authorized by law.
In the case in question the revenue agent in charge wired in a mass of figures,
apparently culled from ledger accounts, and a list of the amount of tax to be
assessed for each of the several years involved. From these data it appears
that the taxpayer had made no returns. As the period approached when the
statute of limitations would be effective, apparently there was no time to be
squandered in analyzing the books and making the returns, and the revenue
agent wired in his findings and recommendations.
It is impossible to find fault with the revenue agent or the commissioner in
acting promptly even if a bit arbitrarily in seeking to protect the government,
and, of course, there is no such inference to be derived from the court’s opinion.
On the other hand, no one reading the court’s opinion can be other than con
vinced of the rectitude of the reasoning and decision.
The fact that impresses the writer, however, is that a taxpayer could so flaunt
the law as to fail to make a return and be saved by what appears as a techni
cality, for surely congress did not intend that anyone should escape taxation
merely because the lawmakers could not foresee every circumstance that might
arise that should be considered in framing the statute. This same fact has un
doubtedly occurred to everyone having contact with the tax laws, especially
where, because of some technicality, a taxpayer has been obliged to pay a tax
upon transactions that, viewed from the standpoint of common sense, did not
involve gain to him.
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However let us take cognizance of the statement of the judge passing upon
this question. He observes:
“Are not citizens, both those who are immediately concerned and
others, entitled to know whether or not the authorities vested with this
great power are exercising it in fairness and moderation? And are they
not entitled to have a record made up at the time which will permanently
and accurately disclose the methods? What is there to show in merely
furnishing the gross amount of the assessment that a wrong rate was not
charged? What is there to enable the taxpayer to be advised as to what
he might ask to be abated? Why should it not be required that the col
lector or commissioner, whichever makes the return, should at least
show the information obtained as far as practicable? Accuracy is not
required, but an honest effort should be made and a contemporary record
should be kept. In the absence of other controlling legislation it is to me
quite clear that congress did definitely require as an essential preliminary
to the assessment of income tax that there should be made a return."

One is impressed with the court’s inference that citizens and others who are
not immediately concerned are entitled to know that the authorities vested
with this great power are exercising it in fairness and with moderation. It is
hoped that a particular few of the large group invested with this great power
will read the court’s observations and believe that others than those immediately
concerned are interested in knowing that there should be nothing arbitrary in
their exercise of the power with which they are vested.
There have been many attempts to interpret as taxable income transactions
that obviously did not result in profit, but because there might be some vague
misgiving as to the purport of the transaction the item was inserted in the rev
enue agent’s report as indicating taxable income, with the idea, no doubt, that
if he were wrong about it the taxpayer would have to prove it to the revenue
agent’s superiors. Revenue agents cannot be expected to be omniscient; they
are not expected to be infallible, but it seems that sometimes some of them do
not exercise their power with moderation and in fairness. Every tax practi
tioner has been confronted with a situation wherein the taxpayer was obliged to
incur considerable expense to prove to the commissioner that a transaction
wholly devoid of profit did not result in income although all the facts
were set forth accurately and in the prescribed manner. Owing, however, to
some suspicion arising in the mind of the examining officer the real facts were
so distorted that it became a task to prove that the deficiency asserted by reason
of this erroneous view was wholly unwarranted. The power of assessment
should be exercised in fairness and moderation, but that does not mean that any
taxpayer should be permitted to pay more or less tax than the law provides
should be paid by him.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
A corporation the entire income of which was derived from rents of property
subject to mortgage as security for bonded indebtedness, may deduct for each
year interest paid on such bonded indebtedness (a) under the act of 1909 in an
amount equal to the interest on the paid-up capital, and (b) under the acts of
1913 and 1916, in an amount equal to the interest on the paid-up capital plus
one-half of the interest-bearing indebtedness for each year, since the property
used as collateral does not come within the proviso of the 1913 and 1916 acts.
(United States circuit court of appeals, second circuit, Ivy Courts Realty Com
pany v. United States of America.)

207

The Journal of Accountancy
A close corporation which declared a cash dividend when it had on hand no
funds with which to pay it, and later paid in cash only the excess of the amount
so declared over a stock assessment levied against its stockholders, may include
in invested capital between the date of declaration and that of the payment of
the dividend, the entire amount of the dividend originally declared. (United
States circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, John L. Flynn, collector v. Haas
Brothers.)
The right to recover a tax by suit is barred where the claim for refund was
filed after the statute of limitations had run.
Loans by a bank evidenced by promissory notes, which were not paid by the
borrowers, are debts deductible when ascertained to be worthless and charged
off, and not losses deductible in the year.
State and county taxes which under the laws of Idaho were imposed upon the
holders of bank stock and paid by the bank and for which it was not reimbursed
by such stockholders, are not deductible from gross income of the bank under
the 1918 act.
Suits for recovery of taxes must be based on the same grounds as those given
in the claim for refund.
Loans alleged to have been negotiated by bank officers in violation of the
Idaho state banking laws, which were not repaid by the borrowers, are not de
ductible by the bank as losses from embezzlement where there was no evidence
of fraudulent intent as required under the statutory definition of embezzlement.
(United States district court, Idaho district, southern division, Citizens State
Bank of Buhl, Idaho, v. United States of America.)
Contributions to a cemetery association were held not deductible as chari
table contributions under sec. 214 (a) (11) of the acts of 1918 and 1921, the
word charitable having been used in such acts to signify corporations organized
and maintained exclusively for eleemosynary purposes. (United States district
court, Massachusetts district, Walter E. Schuster v. Malcolm E. Nichols.)
The sale by a corporation of stock of an affiliated corporation for more than
it had paid for the assets of such company is a capital transaction resulting in
no taxable profit. (United States district court, Massachusetts district,
United Drug Company v. Malcolm E. Nichols.)
Goodwill is not subject to wear and tear, and a deduction for obsolescence of
goodwill due to prohibition is not allowable under sec. 234 (a) (7) of the act
of 1918. (United States district court, district of New York, Haberle Crystal
Spring Brewing Co. v. Jesse W. Clark, collector.)
An agreement between a decedent’s widow and his executors whereby, in
consideration of certain payments, she relinquished (except under certain
contingencies) all claims she might have as surviving widow except her interest
under the will, does not comply with the requirements of the state (Tennessee)
governing dissent from will, and amounts paid the widow in pursuance of
such agreement are not deductible from gross estate as charges allowed by the
laws of jurisdiction under sec. 203 (a) (1) act of 1916. (United States district
court, Tennessee, Lucy G. Briscoe v. E. B. Craig, collector.)
Fees received by the “ standing examiner ” or “auditor ” appointed by Penn
sylvania state courts to report on the financial standing of corporations apply
ing for approval as sureties, indirectly paid by such corporations, are not ex
empt as compensation paid to officers or employers of a state, etc., since
such compensation was not paid by the state. (United States district court,
E. D. Pennsylvania, Phillipus W. Miller v. Blakely D. McCaughn, collector.)
Where an unlimited waiver for 1917 was signed March 1, 1923, a refund of
1918 taxes may not, after date set by the commissioner for the expiration of
all unlimited 1917 waivers, be applied as a credit against an additional tax for
1917 assessed, but no steps for collection having been taken, prior to such
date, since such method is tantamount to collection by distraint after the expira
tion of the statute of limitations. Suit will be against the collector who ap
plied the credit, even though the successor of the one to whom the tax was
paid, though no proper claim for refund was filed and the statute may have
run against a suit for recovery of such taxes. (United States district court,
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N. D. Ohio, E. D., Peerless Paper Box Manufacturing Company v. Carl F.
Routsahn, collector.)
Taxes paid upon notice and demand from a collector, which was based upon
a misrepresentation as to tax shown to be due by audit of taxpayer’s return
for 1920, may be recovered from the collector personally in an action for money
had and received even though after such payment an agreement in writing of
final determination and assessment under section 1312, act of 1921, was executed.
(U. S. district court, S. D. Texas, J. W. Carter Music Company v. J. W. Bass,
collector.)
The use of the donor’s basis as the basis for determining gain derived by a
donee upon the sale of property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, as
provided in sec. 202 (a) (2) act of 1921, is not contrary to the constitution.
(United States circuit court of appeals, second circuit, Frank K. Bowers v.
Elizabeth C. Taft, and Gilbert C. Greenway, Jr.)
A partner may not claim any deduction on account of shrinkage in value of
partnership loan payable in German marks due to depreciation of the value of
the mark. (United States circuit court of appeals, second circuit, George Havi
land v. William H. Edwards.)
A petition for review of a United States board of tax appeals’ decision may be
made where the whole proceeding was before the board there remaining only
the decision to be made which was not concluded before the 1926 act.
The board was in error in holding that certain debts were not bad and
charged off in 1918, that it had no evidence before it as to March 1, 1913,
value of depreciable property and in rejecting evidence before it of such value.
(United States circuit court of appeals, seventh circuit, Chicago Railway Equip
ment Company v. David H. Blair, commissioner.)
An annuity given by will of a taxpayer's husband, in lieu of the statutory
rights in his property to which she was entitled, is not taxable income. (United
States district court, district of Nebraska, Omaha division, Mrs. Arthur D.
Brandeis v. United States of America.)
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